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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, LLNL has developed methods for diagnosing significant quantities of 
special nuclear material (SNM). Homeland security problems have recently focused our 
attention on detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is a weak signal 
problem. Current and advanced safeguards applications will require working in the 
opposite extreme of strong but buried signals. We will review some of the technologies 
that have been developed at LLNL for homeland security applications and discuss how 
they might be used in support of international safeguards.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nuclear fuel cycle of the future presents many technological challenges both in the 
near term, to determine the expected characteristics of the spent fuel and process 
monitoring, and in the long term, safeguards. A specific challenge is how much 
fissionable material is present in a particular sample, production line or storage area.  At 
different stages in the processing, how much SNM (235U and 239Pu/241Pu) is left in the 
spent fuel from the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility? Is the expected amount of SNM in the 
production line, storage area, or waste lines? How can we prove that none of the SNM 
has been diverted? In this paper we will discuss two new technologies developed at 
LLNL that could be applied to safeguards and GNEP. These are: 1) fast neutron counting 
withautomated analysis, and 2) compact solid-state thermal neutron detectors. New 
analysis methods will be briefly discussed. 
 
 
FAST NEUTRON COUNTING 
 
LLNL has developed a segmented liquid scintillator multiplicity counter with nanosecond 
timing, which has 10-5 discrimination of neutrons and gamma-rays above 500 keV. This 
detector is modular and scalable in size depending on overall efficiency requirements. It 
is based on NE-213 xylene-based liquid scintillator modules, now available as BC-501A 
from Bicron and EJ-301 from Eljen. A photo of a 4” x 3” EJ-301 xylene liquid 
scintillator detector and PMT housing is shown in Figure 1. This type of liquid 
scintillator can also be used for neutron spectroscopy by unfolding the energy spectrum 
using a set of response functions. Historically liquid scintillator detectors have had 
relatively poor gamma ray – neutron discrimination from analogue pulse-shape 
discrimination (PSD). With fast digital electronics, far superior neutron – gamma ray 
identification and much lower energy thresholds yield much better overall neutron 
efficiency and identification than is possible with analogue PSD’s. The fast digital 
electronic DAQ system can handle list mode data readout ~10KHz/Ch.  (see Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Photograph of a 4” diameter x 3” Eljen EJ-301 xylene based liquid scintillator 
detector with integration PMT. 
 
Figure 2. Separation between neutrons and gamma-rays in the DAQ system. 
 
 
Used passively, this fast neutron counter can detect isolated fission chain bursts in the 
presence of high backgrounds. High background may occur in storage areas, or when the 
signal is dominated by (alpha,n) or additional spontaneous fission sources. With 3He 
detectors, neutrons created in isolated bursts are spread in time by neutron diffusion times 
required to thermalize the neutrons. Consequently neutrons from different spontaneous 
fission events overlap in time, making it difficult to separate the contributions of multiple 
kinds of neutron sources. This is especially true when the different sources are 
qualitatively statistically similar, as they are for different spontaneous fission sources. 
With this liquid scintillator detector array we have recently demonstrated the isolation of 
individual fission chains in low-multiplying Pu. The liquid scintillator array can be useful 
in quantifying total fissile mass by isolating spontaneous fission bursts; statistically the 
different distributions of emitted neutrons (and gamma-rays) from Cm versus Pu 
spontaneous fission could be distinguished, and the absolute masses determined (from the 
rates of the separate kinds of spontaneous fission sources).  
 
Used actively in conjunction with 60 keV neutron interrogation, the liquid scintillators 
are threshold neutron detectors, blind to the interrogating beam, but responding to the 
induced high-energy fission neutrons. The 60 keV beam energy selectively fissions 235U 
and 239Pu and not 238U or 232Th. With fast timing to isolate induced fission events, this 
technology could be useful for high count rate applications.  
 
This detector array represents two of the suggested highest payoff technologies for NDA 
safeguards for GNEP: Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity and Liquid Multiplicity 
counter with list mode data acquisition1.  
 
ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
We have developed at LLNL a complete analytic point model theory of neutron counting 
distributions and time interval distributions. The foundation of the theory is a complete 
analytic solution2 of the Bohnel3 fission chain model. The fission chain theory completes 
the Dierckx and Hage4 and Hage and Cifarelli5 theory of random time gate and triggered 
time gate counting distributions. We have also developed a theory of time interval 
distributions, including skipped intervals6.  Using this theory we perform a multi-
parameter maximum-likelihood analysis to determine the parameters values that 
characterize the distributions7,8. The parameters are: the system multiplication, a 
diffusion time constant (determined from the time-gate dependent Feynman variance to 
mean – see Figure 3), detection efficiency, spontaneous and (alpha, n) source strengths, 
external direct shine Poisson-distributed background count rate (that can also induce 
fission, as in active interrogation with an (alpha, n) source). A provisional model of 
cosmic ray background is also included. The theory has also been extended to include the 
neutron capture gamma-ray signal. 
 
A random source used in active interrogation of HEU, and that dominates the count rate 
due to direct shine on the 3He counters, is robustly separated in this analysis. This is 
because the Poisson contribution is qualitatively different from the fission signal, and its 
contribution is characterized by only a single parameter, the external count rate. This 
separation of sources capability can possibly be extended to the problem of separating the 
Pu contribution from a dominant Cm source, especially if this analysis is applied to the 
fast timing signal.  
 
 
Figure 3. 252Cf spontaneous fission count distribution (blue) compared to a Poisson 
distribution of the same count rate (red) for a 512 μsec time gate. The right panel shows 
the time dependent Feynman variance to mean. The last point is determined by the 
increased variance of the count distribution in the left panel. 
 
 
The liquid scintillator detectors also bring energy discrimination of the neutron flux 
which will inherently contain some information of the source (spontaneous fission vs. 
alpha induced neutrons) but also leads to our third area of investigation which is low 
energy neutron interrogation of a sample.   SNM has the feature of significant fast 
neutron induced fission cross-sections in the 10’s of keV neutron energy range which is 
several orders of magnitude greater than that for the Cm isotopes (which are also much 
scarcer than the SNM isotopes in the expected spent fuel stream).  Therefore measuring 
with the resulting increase in fast neutrons of energy greater than an interrogating beam 
of 60-100 keV neutrons will determine when compared to the passive flux, the relative 
amount of SNM in the sample or stream in question.           
 
SOLID STATE NEUTRON DETECTORS 
 
LLNL is currently developing configurable, real-time, low-power, compact, solid state 
neutron detection system for special nuclear materials neutron signature detection with 
10% thermal neutron detection efficiency. This neutron detection system can be used for 
long term monitoring of nuclear material in storage, or it can be an added feature in a tag 
or seal. These neutron detection systems can be also used for detecting or monitoring 
neutron emissions in areas (e.g., underwater, in pipes, etc.) where there are complex 
scattering environments, no available power, and little or no human access. There are two 
configurations in the neutron detector, namely 10B for thermal neutrons and 6,7LiF for 
higher energy neutrons. 
 
LLNL originally developed novel inexpensive neutron detectors for the long-term 
monitoring of neutron activity from contraband nuclear material in areas that are 
inaccessible, such as a cargo-ship container during transport9 Our design uses 5mm-
diameter, self-biased 10B-coated neutron detectors (tiny neutron tags) that have 2% 
efficiency for thermal neutron detection. These detectors have been demonstrated in the 
laboratory that they can detect neutrons emitted from plutonium in a complex scattering 
environment in a reasonable amount of time.  These coin-sized detectors (when mass-
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produced) could be ~$20 a piece. For Safeguards, a simple detector that can be placed on 
pipes and casks to determine bulk measurement of neutrons (or lack thereof) for tracking 
processes and ensuring there is no diversion. 
 
We have developed a prototype of a tiny tag with 15mW electronics (See Figure 4). Time 
information of each event is stored for further data analysis. These semi-conductor 
detectors are better than currently available  6Li doped scintillation fibers and 
photomultiplier based scintillation detectors. They are also immune to gamma-rays and 
stable in comparison to 3He tubes.  
 
 
Figure 4. Solid state based neutron detection system with 15mW electronics. 
 
More recently, we are developing next generation solid-state neutron detectors with 
thermal neutron detection efficiency beyond 25%. These high aspect ratio pillars10 will 
be filled with CVD 10B, 6,7LiF for both thermal and low energy neutron detection. (Figure 
5) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. High aspect ratio silicon pillar structure developed at LLNL. When filled with 
10B and 6,7LiF, the neutron detection efficiency for this system can be as high as 50%. 
 
These inexpensive tiny tags can be used for ubiquitous neutron monitoring in the GNEP 
processes as “smart tags” for tracking material flow. In a centrifuge facility, they may be 
used as neutron imagers within the centrifuge hall to monitor for possible diversions 
(Neutron imagers have been suggested by Mark Pickrell.)11  The information can be 
propagated with wireless options.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
We have discussed two technologies developed at LLNL for Homeland Security 
applications. We have given some reasons why these techniques can be brought to bear 
on the Safeguards problem. 
 
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48. 
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